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The 'pay at all costs and borrow/get ODA/bargain on
US payments for bases in order to do so' strategy of
the President, Secretaries of Finance and Centrai
Bank Governors (including those appointed in the
January 1990 reshuffle) has kept Philippine external
debt's secondary market value to 50 per cent of face
and been welcomed by creditors - commercial,
bilateral and official. It has probably played some role
in mobilising ODA and encouraging direct investment
inflows, both of which are significant. It has not
secured new funds in the sense of net inflows of overall
external resources nor has it closed the financing gap.
The strategy and the negotiations have been the object
of sustained, widely based criticism in the press and by
an umbrella Freedom from Debt Coalition, which
groups academics, business organisations, church
groups, labour and peasant bodies and support
groups. Their main proposals have turned on gross
debt service capping (at 10 per cent to 20 per cent of
gross visible exports or one quarter to one half of
1986-88 average gross payments), selective repudiation
(of up to $6 bn of loans inherently flawed by
corruption the lenders knew of or should have known
of), bond swaps or secondary market purchases at a
high discount and Paris Club renegotiations on a multi
year, long grace period (interest and principal) plus
long payback basis. Legislation on debt service
capping as a means to force satisfactory debt
renegotiation terms was passed by an overwhelming
majority in the Senate and has majority support in the
House, but the President has made clear she would
veto it. Some Cabinet Ministers (now largely ex-
Ministers) favour debt capping and going into
selective partial arrears on debt service.
A Debt Council including some critics of the 1986-89
strategy has been appointed by the President, but has
few powers and exhibits something very close to a built
in 'pacta sunt servanda' majority. Some fairly
imaginative but small debt buybacks (nominally by
government owned financial institutions, not by the
State) have been carried out. Beyond that pre-1989
approaches and results were very much like early post-
1982 Latin American London and Paris Club models.
Financing Requirement and Timing
The initial National Economic Development Authority
estimate of the 1989-90 external resource gap was
27
Overview
The Philippine public sector medium and long-term
commercial bank debt renegotiations concluding in
September-October 1989 were intended to be the
centre piece of closing a 1989 external resource gap of
$1.3 to 1.5 bn and a 1990 gap of $0.1 to 0.4 bn. They
took place in the context of a reaffirmation by
President Aquino and her Central Bank Governor and
Secretary of Finance that the whole external debt
could, should and would be paid.
The outcome of the negotiations was two agreed
targets:
$1 bn of 'new money' either as medium and long-
term (MLT) loans or as 15 year non-reschedulable
bonds at 13/16 per cent over Libor to be taken up
by June 30, 1991;
$1.3 bn buyback of public sector MLT (20 per
cent of outstanding) at 50 per cent discount
financed by the ¡MF. the World Bank and the
Ex-Im Bank of Japan to take place during the
course of 1990.
Background
Philippine external debt is in the $27.5 to $29 bn range
as of early 1990. Of this $13 bn is commercial bank
including $10 bn MLT of which $6.6 bn is public
sector debt.
Over 1986-88 annual net transfers of debt interest and
principal averaged $l.7bn orS per cent of GDP -
after a variety of partial commercial bank (CB) and
Paris Club rescheduling negotiations. 1989-92 pro-
jections are for $1.5 bn annually assuming no new
borrowings or renegotiations.
The 1988 growth rate was 6.5 per cent. Official 1989
projections were: with closing of the finance gap 6 per
cent and without 4.6 per cent. In the event total Paris
Club and regular rollover CB savings on outflow and
limited increases in trade credit may have totalled $0.3
to $0.4 bn implying growth of about 5.0 per cent.
However growth in tourism and direct foreign
investment (likely to be reversed in 1990 following the
November 1989 nearly successful coup attempt) plus
some use of reserves allowed 5.8 per cent (tentative
first estimate) growth.
$2.2 bn. The reduction to $1.7 bn accepted in the 1989
IMF 'Letter of Intent' was on assumptions as to trade
deficits and growth rates inconsistent with the NEDA
model (and on trade, at least, with reality). That figure
was cut to $1.4 bn by Paris Club reschedulings $0.1 bn
above estimate (100 per cent not 70 per cent of interest
rescheduled) and by £0.2bn on CB rescheduling of
1990 principal payments. The division - on the IMF
estimate - was $1.3 bn in 1989 and $0.14 bn in 1990.
Concerning the outcome of the CB negotiation, two
points stand out:
$1.0 bn of 'new money' (if achieved) and $0.078 bn
of net interest saving (for one year as no funds were
drawable in 1989) on buyback does not add up to
$1.4 bn (much less $1.9 bn on the NEDA estimate
adjusted for other reschedulings);
the timing of flows is inconsistent with that of the
projected gap. On reasonable projections, as of
October, $0 would come in 1989; $250 mn might
come in the first half of 1990; $400 mn in the second
half of 1990 and $425 mn in the first half of 1991.
'New Money'
The 'new money' component of the negotiated targets
is $0.9 bn for major banks and $0.1 bn for those with
smaller exposures. This can be in normal MLTs or in
15 year non-rescheduled bonds at the option of the
banks. Each bank can pick the form it prefers and the
amount of its additional exposure, i.e. the target is a
ceiling with no guarantee it will be met or even
approximated.
As of mid-January 1990, only $0.62 bn had been
pledged or semi pledged. The new Secretary of
Finance was on a four nation tour to try to drum up
the balance by a deadline extended from January to
the end of February.
As the 'new money' is significantly less than principal
repayments on old debt, is too late for 1989, at
13/16 per cent over Libor is not concessional and
under the bond option would bar rescheduling, it is
hard to see this leg of the arrangements as a great
success even if $1.0 bn is raised.
Secondary Market Purchases
It appears that a 50 per cent discount has been agreed
with the banks (under pressure from the IMF and
World Bank who indicated their reluctance to finance
buybacks at the 30 per cent discount proposed by the
CBs). Voluntary offers of the order of $1.5 bn face
value, exceeded the purchasing power of the $0.650 bn
raised from a Fund-Bank-Bilateral consortium of
lenders who financed the January 1990 repurchase.
World Bank approval of $0.2 bn exclusively for
repurchase is the first tranche of what the outgoing
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Central Bank Governor described as a pledged
package of $1.55 bn to retire $3 bn more of debt at
SUper cent of face value by the end of 1991.
The problem with this approach - which does mark a
breakthrough in using ¡FI and bilateral loans to a
government to repurchase its own debt at a discount
- is that it does little for the short term financing gap.
In that respect the debate on the relative merits of
discounted debt buybacks versus collateralised,
discounted bond swaps is very much secondary to the
point that the main gains come primarily on future
obligations - especially for repayment of principal -
rather than on present interest payments, so they
cannot be the main source of plugging the short run
financing gap. Further if these approaches are limited
to CB channelled MLT loans to the public sector they
would cover only about a fifth of total debt. At aSO per
cent discount they would therefore reduce the debt
burden only by 10 per cent plus the amount by which
interest on Fund-Bank-Bilateral loans used was below
that on the retired debt - perhaps 12 per cent in total.
Where Next?
In including debt reduction (apparently only because
it was stressed in the Brady Plan), the Philippines has
altered its macro renegotiation strategy in a way which
increases potential long-term gains. However the
amount is marginal and the short-term gains almost
negligible when set against the financing gap.
It is hard to avoid concluding that the present
Philippine strategy is unlikely to be adequate. The
basic target should be to reduce net debt service either
to zero (treating grants as well as new loans as offsets)
or at worst to 10 per cent of visible exports. That
would free 5 per cent of GDP and 20 per cent of the
recurrent budget for investment, would extinguish the
financing gap and be roughly consistent with 6 per
cent growth. This in turn would allow 1980
GNP/capita levels to be restored in the first half of the
1990s. It would also give some stability to debt service
net outflow projections and force longer term, more
realistic negotiations.
'Pacta nul servanda sunt' might - as the Freedom
From Debt Coalition and Congress believe - be a
better approach than the present one. It would force
negotiations aimed at reducing present gross debt
service by an average of 50 per cent and defacto put the
focus on debt reduction, as it would be clear that
present debts could not be fully serviced within a
10 per cent of visible export earnings net service
ceiling. CB debt burden would need to go down by
50 per cent, i.e. substitution of 50 per cent reduced
principal amount of loans (whether by collateralised
swap or buyback) at interest rates no higher than the
present ones. Action analogous in results, albeit not
necessarily form, would be needed on the Paris Club
front. Conversion of all IMF drawings to ESAF
(which is beginning) and agreements with the World
Bank and ADB to lend at least as much as repayments
plus interest are a third component with selective debt
repudiation of loans in which corruption went to the
heart of the transaction a fourth.
The 1989 CB agreement does not represent significant
movement in that direction, as well as not meeting the
immediate need for closing the external resource gap.
It is more likely to act as a further impediment to
sustained rapid growth and to require further rounds
of interminable negotiations with the prospect of
further delays in debt service payments but no
adequate reduction in the overall burden of external
debt.
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